The Political Dynamics of People’s Power

It was people’s power, more than any other thing, which swept Marcos from his Malacañang throne and which installed in his place Corazon Aquino as the new president of the Philippines. It would also be people’s power which could prevent a Marcos comeback, even without Marcos himself, or an emergence of a new dictatorship for that matter. But what exactly does the term people’s power mean?

People’s power would simply refer to the capacity of the people to chart social circumstances that are consonant with their own aspirations. Consequently, this entails the realization of the people themselves of their own power to make history. People’s power is manifested either in spontaneous or organized forms of action. For instance, the bulk of those who participated in the so-called “February Revolution were unorganized individuals who responded to the situation spontaneously.

It is argued here, however, that a more organized form of people’s power is needed in the more delicate and complicated task of rebuilding a broken nation and restructuring an oppressive social dispensation. At the same time, people’s power will continue to be meaningful force in society only if the masses would actually constitute themselves into self organized groups capable of voicing their own demands in the center stage of politics. In this sense, the presence of autonomous mass organization in the political system would not only serve to promote pro-people policies in government but would also act as a countervailing mechanism to the possible abuse and corruption of the state power. The institution of new politics based on popular democracy would also deter the desires of the traditional politicians to swing the country back to the old politics based on intra-elite competition which existed prior to martial law.

The Basis of Elite Politics

Elite democracy held sway in the Philippines during the post-colonial period up to the imposition of martial law in 1972. It was characterized by the dominance of two major political parties, the Nationalista Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP), whose members only switched from one camp to the other. This had been made possible by the virtual identicalness of the platform of government of both parties. The NP and LP were in fact simply two factions of the same ruling class.

Elite politics is founded along an elaborate system of patronage politics feature pork barrel allocations and the spoils system. Patronage politics among Filipinos is a function of a kinship system. On the other hand, this is due to the Filipino cultural value of organic hierarchy. In effect, these arguments tell us that elite politics is here to stay because it is inherent among Filipinos.

The roots of elite patronage politics lie in the persistence of intense social inequality and mass poverty. An impoverished citizenry could be easily tempted into exchanging their votes for promises of rewards in the form of money and jobs from wealthy politicians. It is not surprising, therefore for politicians to train their sights on slum areas as targets for vote-buying sprees during elections.

The prominence of political warlords in the Philippine political scene manifests a social set-up where the concentration of wealth and power in the lands of the few could facilitate the commission of fraud and terrorism during electoral exercises. That’s why Philippine elections have always been violent. In 1971, election-related killing reached the all time high of 243. By early 1971, there were 80 political warlords around the country. With the imposition of martial law, Marcos destroyed only the political warlords antagonistic to him. It would be a real test for the leadership of Aquino if she could destroy the power base of Marcos’s political warlords as well as prevent the reemergence of old ones and the appearance of new ones.

Martial Law and the Politics of Repression

Martial law did not put an end to elite politics. It merely narrowed down its expression within the Marcos faction of the elite. Instead of intra-elite competition, there was state corporatism. While breaking the backs of all independent political institutions, Marcos sought to establish government-controlled or influenced once under this command.

With the closure of the Congress and the crackdown on political parties and the mass media, the traditional politicians were disenfranchised of their power bases. They were consequently knocked out of the political ring during the early days of martial law. The opportunism of these politicians could readily be seen when announcements came in 1978 that elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) would be held and that a new party the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement) would be formed by the Marcos government. Former NP and LP members excitedly rushed into the arms of Marcos. With the reversal of the political pendulum, these same people are now rushing to embrace Aquino.

Some staunch opposition politicians, however refused to join the bandwagon but in the meantime dreamt of the day when their old political parties would be revived. On the other hand, some highly respected nationalist politicians of pre martial law days like Lorenzo Tañada and Jose Diokno decided to cast their lot with the anti-facist, anti-imperialist mass movement, thus giving credence to the relevance of pressure politics at this specific historical movement.

Remember that this were times it was not yet fashionable to wear yellow nor was it safe to identify one’s self with the cause of the opposition. It was an inquisitorial period when the sample assertion of basic human rights could be interpreted as subversive and could therefore earn one a vacation in prison or a trip to heaven. However, it was precisely this repressive political atmosphere fostered by martial law which impelled many cause-oriented individuals to persevere in their commitment to politicize and organize the people into mass organizations that would serve as channel’s of people’s power in the struggle for justice and democracy during those dark days. If there is anything to be thankful about martial law, it is the fact that it taught people to fight for their rights and to assert their interests.

The Aquino Assassination and the Confetti Revolutionaries

The Political aftermath of the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. at the tarmac of the Manila International Airport on August 21, 1983 placed to a severe test the Marcos regime’s capacity to rule in the old way. The brazen murder of such a prominent Marcos critic shocked the sensibilities of many people who previously did not care about the killing of workers in the picket lines or the massacre of peasants in the rural areas.

The urban Middle class climbed out of their closets and demonstrated their opposition to the repressive regime by throwing yellow confettis from the safety of their tall office buildings in Ayala. After five o’clock they would blow their distinctively cautions middle class flavor in these acts of protest. At the same time, the festive Filipino atmosphere which attended at the first confetti rallies after the Aquino assassination would serve as a fitting prelude to the type of revolution that Filipinos would be making during those four days of February in 1986.

The entry of the “yellow” protestors into the political field swelled the ranks of the anti-dictatorship mass movement which was up to then under the leadership of the national democratic organizations. However, the potentials of these new political forces in successfully waging an urban struggle to depose Marcos was not appreciated by the national democrats who were peripheralized at the outbreak of the “February Revolution”.

The Elections which the Dictatorship Miscalculated

On November 3, 1985, President Ferdinand Marcos announced over American television his desire for snap presidential elections on February 7, 1986. He stated that he was calling it in order to get a fresh mandate from the people. However, the real impetus for the snap polls was a combination of political strategy and American pressure. Marcos felt that an earlier local election, originally scheduled for May 1986, would divide his KBL power base and thereby hamper his own presidential chances if the presidential polls are set for 1987. At the same time, Marcos wanted to demonstrate to the United States government that he was still capable of maintaining stability in the country.

Of course, Marcos did not call the elections only to end up as the loser. The historical fact that a dictator never allows himself to lose in his own election became the starting point of debates among cause-oriented organizations as to the efficacy of participating in the snap polls.

The big coalition of national democratic organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) decided to boycott the polls although six of its national leaders. Including their chairman, Tañada, filed leaves of absences from the organization to support Cory Aquino. According to BAYAN, as a matter of “principle”, participation in the sham election would only legitimize the dictatorship. But for other progressive groups, the issue was not one of principle alone which was idealistic but one of “praxis” which combined theory and practice. The intellectual simply had to go down his ivory tower in order to find out that the masses were for using the elections to voice out their discontent. BANDILA (Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin), a coalition of social democratic and liberal democratic organizations and the socialist group Independent Caucus carried the line of “critical participation” or “participation without illusions”. While they agreed that it may not take an election to defeat the Marcos dictatorship, they also realized the significance of using the election as a venue for furthering the political education and organization of the people. After all, it is especially during election time that people are most receptive to political ideas and discussions.

Popular Support for Cory

Corazon Aquino, widow of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. became the united opposi-tion presidential candidate through a campaign which showed a million people affixing their signatures in a draft for her to run. The message was simple. Cory Aquino was the only 4

candidate acceptable to many political aggrupations. For instance, Jovito Salonga, Eva Estrada Kalaw, Aquilino Pimentel, among others, all threatened to run for president if Salvador Laurel was chosen official opposition candidate.

Without the luxury of an intensive, media coverage afforded to Marcos, Aquino went on grassroots campaign sorties which brought her to the whole length of archipelago while her rival campaigned on radio and television. Each time she arrived in a place, Mr. Aquino would be met by an avalanche of enthusiastic people chanting her name. The opposition campaign scenes would be reminiscent of adulating movie fans shrieking as they see their favorite screen idols. One might refer to this situation in terms of a “fan club” mentality translated into politics.

Evidently, the people identified the opposition not with UNIDO (United Nationalist and Democratic Opposition), the political party under which Aquino then run for president, but with Cory. Indeed, Cory Aquino became the new symbol of the opposition replacing her husband Ninoy who was the rallying symbol of the people after the tarmac incident. In the eyes of the people, Cory Aquino is the exact opposite of Marcos. She evokes sincerity because she is not a politician. We could even surmise that her politician husband would have not gotten such tremendous response from the people.

In the past, ordinary people viewed politics as dirty; they perceived politics as equivalent to corrupt politicians. Hence, the clean image projected by Mrs. Aquino as a non-politician aroused hopes in people that she would not be the same corrupt official that Marcos was. It could be said therefore that the masses of people who supported Corazon Aquino were moved by both anti-Marcos and anti-politician sentiments.

How Marcos Politicized the People

NAMFREL (National Citizens Movement for Free Elections), accredited as the citizens arm of the Commission on Election (COMELEC), proved to be a pain in the neck for Marcos. With the words “bantay ng bayan” (peoples vigilantes) emblazoned on their white t-shirts and jackets, the NAMFREL, volunteers doggedly watched over the electoral proceedings in the different polling places, going to the extent of guarding the ballots with their own lives. In the process which they subjected to all forms of harassments and terrorism.

This demonstration of people’s vigilance is different from the kind of participation shown by the people in pre-martial law elections. Previously, people saw their duty as done with the casting of their ballots. Under the authoritarian regime, however, the people realized that the desire for clean elections involved a political struggle that is both radical and dangerous, as it is continuing.

Playing crucial roles in countering the hegemony of government propaganda, intended to prepare the minds of the people for Marcos victory, would be the alternative mass media with courageously reported and broadcast the anomalies perpetrated in the February polls. Even before the official Batasan court of the elections came out, it was clear in the minds of the people that the real winner in the election was Corazon Aquino.

With the massive exposure of cheating and outright terrorism the official result of the election was no longer of consequences. With the utter failure of the electoral process, the political struggle was now transferred to the terrain of mass pressure politics.

The election therefore produced two candidates for the same post both claiming victory. On the one hand, we had Marcos claiming a legal victory because he had the support of the Batasan. On the other hand, we had Aquino claiming a popular victory because she had the support of the people. As succeeding events would show, people’s power would make the final pronouncement of who actually won.

The Civil Disobedience Movement

Marcos thought that the popular indignation about the electoral result would die a natural death in the same manner that the post-Aquino assassination protest campaign collapsed. He adopted a wait-and-see strategy in this regard. Once again he was clearly on the defensive in terms of propaganda. He was only waiting, however, for the proper opportunity to crack down on his enemies.

On the other hand, the Marcos regime’s attempt to reassert its ideological hold upon the people received a crucial blow from an unlikely source – the official Catholic Church which was well known for its conservative and “critical collaboration” stance vis-à-vis the Marcos regime. The official Church hierarchy, though the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), issued a strongly-worded statement on February 14, 1986 describing the snap polls as “unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct”. The 66 bishops emphasized that “the government that retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis”. In a country where the overwhelming majority is Catholics, as the call of the bishops for a “non-violent struggle for justice”, definitely titled the balance of the ideological scale in favor of the opposition forces. With the blessing of the bishops, the opposition braced itself for a long civil disobedience campaign to force the Marcos regime to respect the will of the people.

The post-election protest campaign by the opposition kicked off with the “Tagumpay ng Bayan” (Victory of the People) rally at Luneta on February 18, 1986, the day after the Batasan proclamation of the Marcos-Tolentino tandem. In this rally, Cory Aquino outlined a protest program featuring the boycott of well-known crony corporations (e.g., Rustans, San Miguel Corporation, Security Bank, etc.). She also asked the people to stop watching Channel 4 and to stop buying establishment newspapers, as well as to hold back payments of water and electric bills.

The rationale behind the protest campaign, which threatened to escalate into a full-blown civil disobedience movement, was the idea that a government that bad lost its legitimacy did not deserve the obedience and compliance of its people.

The schools became the important centers of protest. It should be noted that classes were suddenly suspended by the Ministry of Education with still two weeks to go prior to the election. The suspension virtually derailed the holding of mock elections and opposition sorties in the campuses. After all, majority of all the voters were below the 25 year old bracket. At the University of the Philippines and Ateneo University, alternative classes were held. The faculty and students there found it abnormal to continue holding normal classes in an abnormal situation. At De La Salle University, an “operation work stoppage” was undertaken to convince people within the 4th district of Manila to support Cory Aquino’s call for a work stoppage on February 26, 1986, a day after Marcos’s expected inauguration into office.

The big labor unions together with other mass organizations had also expressed their support for Cory’s plan for civil disobedience. In effect, the scenario was set for a broad front to unseat the Marcos regime from power through mass protest.

The American government, on the other hand, appeared to be uncomfortable with this type of politics. It feared that such mass initiatives could develop into a deep anti-American sentiment which manifested its initial signs when US President Ronald Reagan stated that both the Marcos and Aquino camps were equally responsible for committing fraud and violence in the February polis, and above all, that his main concern is the safety of the American bases in the Philippines. Hence, up to the eve of the February rebellion, special US envoy Philip Habib was in Manila negotiating for a government set-up where there would be power sharing between Marcos and Aquino, which the latter firmly refused.

The February Revolution

The defections of the Enrile and Ramos factions of the military the night of February 22,  1986 signalled the start of the so-called “four days in February” which toppled the Marcos regime. It also brought into the open the deep divisions in the military especially those existing between the regular officers who come from the Philippine Military Academy and the integree officers.

The dramatic support thrown by the people to the military rebels were mostly members of the RAM (Reform AFP Movement) served as the fulcrum by which the indecisive generals resolved to support the rebel soldiers. On the other hand, the inability of Marcos to control the revolt during its early hours considerably weakened his options as the days passed. With so many civilians surrounding the two camps- Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo- where the reformist soldiers were holed in, it was obvious that a direct military confrontation could only be done at the cost of the lives of so many people. Such a catastrophe would invite international revulsion against Marcos’s regime and could perhaps close all exit doors for him once he decides to leave the country.

In the meantime, the political contest was fought more in the mass media rather than in actual military combat. If anything could be said of the February rebellion, it is the fact that the political struggle was fought largely on the level of propaganda rather than of military might. Ratio Veritas played a vital role as the coordinating arm of the popular uprising. It should be noted that the mass base of the Camp Crame uprising were unorganized people who sought instructions through the radio.

The short duration of the revolt was characteristic of its urban setting. Having been fought in the center of power itself changes in the constellation of forces occurred very decisively. Control of vital media facilities, for instance, swept the tide in favor of the rebellion. The takeover of the government television, Channel 4, cut off Marcos’s contact and influence with the people from inside his Malacañang garrison.

Many people believe that the mass movement which hoisted Corazon Aquino to power composed a minority of the Filipino population. This is true but only from a narrow empiricistic point of view. Certainly, this is the specificity of the urban rebellion: you strike from the cities to the country sides.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that people responded so enthusiastically to the military revolt because they see it as simply a continuation of the civil disobedience movement to out Marcos from power. From the context of political dynamics, it was a continuation of the political process where people’s power was expressed in support of Cory Aquino all over the country, beginning from the electoral campaign which proceeded to the civil disobedience campaign and culminated in a mass rebellion which drove Marcos into exile.

An Ode to People’s Power

Many people are still at a loss as to whether the “four days in February” could rightfully be called a “revolution”. It is a revolution alright but only in terms of overturning our political culture from one of passivity to one of active involvement. It is a revolution in terms of people realizing their own collective power to make history. It is a revolution in terms in people wanting to actively participate in the shaping of their own future instead of entrusting it in the hands of a few politicians. In short, it is a political revolution but one that remains unfinished because the political structures of dictatorship have not been completely transformed. At the same time, the concrete political structure of a truly popular democracy has yet to be fully delivered from the womb of the old political order.

On the other hand, the “February Revolution” is certainly not a revolution in terms of overhauling the oppressive structures of Philippine society. It is not a social revolution so to speak. It does not prevent the people, however, from transforming it into one. People’s power, after all, did not end with the exit of the Marcos regime from the Philippine political scene.

President Aquino herself recognized this fact. In the “Misa ng Bayan” (Mass of the People) held at lucena on March 2, 1986, she urged the people to set up people’s organizations at the grassroots and community levels to transform people’s power into permanent structures that would safeguard the gains of the people revolution.

An organized citizenry is definitely a more effective agent of social change than a mass of individuals groping for direction. The consolidation of people into mass organizations and self-management institutions would go a long way in facilitating the process of popular participation in every aspect of our society.

Conclusion

“The unstated goal of the People Power Revolution was not a mere change of regimes, but rather a systemic change, a real social transformation.” Thus did the late Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes describe the impact of EDSA I in an article he wrote in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on November 2, 1986. He continues: “ This will entail not only a change of leaders but also – and more important – a change of heart on the part of the new leadership. In this sense, the People Power Revolution was a prelude, rather than a complete fulfillment. The real Revolution is yet to be.”

People power, after all, is not an empty concept but a dynamic one fraught with ideals. It is, in fact, bolstered by the ideals of a democratic and constitutionalist system like the Philippines.

People power should not be viewed outright as an attack or a serious challenge upon a constitutionalist regime. Instead, it should be viewed as a mechanism to fill the gaps of a system adhering to constitutionalism and the rule of law. I think we have been extremely fortunate to have stumbled upon people power as a tool for resolving difficult political crises at a time when armed uprisings have become increasingly costly for nations in the modem world. While other societies remain trapped in dysfunctional political structures and processes that impede their growth, we have been more daring in our quest for solutions, trusting only in the basic goodwill of our people. In fine, the concepts of people power should not be regarded as opposing ideas. After all, they all walk for the benefit of the people: by enhancing democracy and promoting justice.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Lande, C. “Brief History of Political Parties”, Jose Abueva and Raul de Guzman (eds.), Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics, (Manila: Bookmark, 1969) pp. 151-157. 2. Regime, Jr., F. “The Philippines After 1986 Revolution”, Electoral Politics, (2010) pp.6-7. 3. Weir, Fraser./University of Alberta (2009). A Centennial History of Philippine Independence. Retrieved from the World Wide Web last 18 December 2009: http://www.ualberta.ca/~vmitchel/ 4. Transparency International. (2004).Global Corruption Report. February 2010 http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2004. 5. Wurfel, David. (1977). Martial Law in the Philippines: The Methods of Regime Survival. In Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1977), pp. 5-30 6. US Library of Congress. From Aquino’s Assassination to People’s Power. http://countrystudies.us/philippines/29.htm