Television Influence

            A commonly repeated generalization in the political communication literature is Patterson and McClure’s (1976) conclusion that voters learn issue information from television advertisements but not from television news. The two assertions are often paired in syntheses of the literature (e.g., Diamond 1978; Diamond and Bates 1984; Nimmo 1978; O’Keefe and Atwood 1981). The study has been cited at least 150 times in academic journals (Social Sciences Citation Index 1976-93), including recent publications by political scientists (Bartels 1993;  Finnkel 1993); some mass communication researchers consider it a “classic” of the political campaign literature (Weaver and Drew 1993).

            Often overlooked when citing Patterson and McClure’s conclusions is the limited scope of their study, conducted during a single campaign (Nixon-McGover, 1972 election) in a single county (Onondaga County, New York). Subsequent voter surveys have sometimes found little correlation between knowledge and attention to political commercials (see, e.g., Drew and Weaver 1991), and others attribute clear learning effects to television news (see, e.g., Bartels 1993; Drew and Reeves 1980; Lasorsa 1986; Mcleod and McDonald 1985; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Sears and Chaffe 1979). Patterson and McClure’s result remains prominent in the literature more because it was the first to make an explicit contrast between learning from TV news and ads than because it is consistent with most subsequent studies.

            The “rule” that ads are important to issue learning while news is not affects both research and practice. Just, Crigler, and Wallach (1990), as one instance, decided in their campaign research not to study television news at all. They concentrated instead on commercials (and on television debates), citing Patterson and McClure as justification for their design. Diamond and Bates (1984) reported that political campaign managers’ beliefs regarding television news and ads are also affected by the Patterson-McClure conclusion, guiding daily decisions in field campaigns. The proposition that ads are more informative than news is not grounded in any general theory (Kraus and Davis 1981, p.278). Indeed, it runs counter to many people’s intuition-a feature that has probably helped attract attention to it. The more common view of political commercials is probably that of the prominent practitioner who called them “the most deceptive, misleading, unfair and untruthful of all advertising” (Ogilvy 1985, pp. 210-13).

            Broadcast journalists, while criticized on many sides, are generally conscientious reporters who strive to be informative (Halberstam 1979). While local news programs may emphasize trivial events, political campaigns do get considerable TV coverage-partly, perhaps, in response to criticisms of television news following the Patterson-McVlure report. To infer that voters do not benefit form following the news on television implies that this extensive professional effort goes for naught. Uncontrolled correlational studies suggest that TV news is less informative about politics than are newspapers, but this result does not hold up with controls for measurement error (Bartels 1993), prior knowledge (Chaffe and Schleuder 1986; Chaffe, Ward, and Tipton 1970), or questioning about “attention” to TV news rather than mere frequency of exposure (Chaffe and Schleuder 1986; McLeod and McDonald 1985). Still, empirical comparisons of ads versus news effects have been outnumbered in the literature by repetition of Patterson and McClure’s conclusions, such as their assertion (1976, p.54) that network TV news is “simply not informative.”

            The effect on political participation of large-scale political telecasts has been the subject of much speculation. Behind most prognostications lies the fundamental assumption that the advent of televised politics means a short-circuiting of party machines (Gould, 1954). After the epochal telecast of the 1952 political conventions, we were told that each televiwer had become a participant in a town meeting of America. Moreover, since each viewer in the privacy of his living room could pass an independent judgment on whatever issue was at stake, such viewers would increasingly, it was predicted, participate in and influence public decisions. The viewer’s scrutiny, it was held, would also affect political institutions, and viewer distastes for what was witnessed was expected to lead to “fundamental changes in convention procedures,” (Bogardus, 1952). Likewise, the case for a national Presidential primary was reported to have been revitalized following public reaction to the video presentation.

                        The people of America saw the in-efficient, archaic, and disgraceful method of   selecting Presidents at the conventions which were held in Chicago… There is no doubt but what the people of the United States did not like what they saw. They don’t believe it    is good democracy to leave the selection of Presidential candidates in the hands of a few haggling, back-room barons of professional politicians (1953).

            Such claims raise questions as to: (a) the relationship between political participation via video and such participation via organized channels; and (b) the limits and potentialities of releviewing as a source of political intelligence.

            Definitive observations concerning the impact of TV on political participation must, obviously, await history. Meanwhile, attempts to study and anticipate that impact must go beyond the special circumstances surrounding particular campaigns and particular issues and beyond how, at different times and places, the medium has been exploited by politicians, public relations experts, and mass communicators. From the different ways in which people use their television experience, we must abstract what is characteristic of and efficacious in the television experience as such. It is to the latter problem that this paper addresses itself. Our thesis is that, notwithstanding any peculiarities in the presentation of any network or the orientations characterizing particular groups of viewers, there is a phenomenon inherent in the nature of television as a mass medium whose implications for political participation demand consideration

            The generalizations concerning the television perspective and the way in which group of viewers tended to cope with it are the end product of modest though carefully analyzed study. The design and procedures followed are detailed elsewhere (Lang, 1954; Summer, 1955).

Analysis of TV commentator references and of special and exclusive camera shots suggests that the telecaster aimed to endow the viewer with a kind of “omniscience.” The television coverage amounted to an electronic transport to everywhere, keeping up with everyone and everything in and at the convention; but telecasters took for granted a near limitless ability on the part of the viewer to orient him in a multiplicity of roles.

            Participation in political affairs via TV, this “living politics at a distance,” is an experience clearly distinct from political participation in an organized setting. The opportunity to observe does not suffice to transform members of an active public. While it may arouse interest in viewing similar telecasts, it does not necessarily stimulate-and may even discourage-active political participation. Politics may become a diversion rather than a citizen or partisan activity.

             Such a political consequence of televised politics would reside in the discrepancy between the nature of the actual participation by a member of the mass audience and his conviction that he has been, in fact, transported to the convention. The impact of the distinction between the participation of the mass audience and active political participation goes beyond the niceties or even the utility of conceptual clarity. For, like the televising of other major public events, the televising of the conventions made a big story.

            Whenever an innovation enters or any other area of social life, people speculate about its effects. The search for effects has been a central theme of mass media research for decades. And since television from the start seemed such a gripping instrument and so widely distributed, it was assumed that television “must” affect the political behavior of its audience. Some observers have guessed that television has important effects on voting turnout. They believe that television has direct effects by continually reminding people to vote through exhortations in spot announcements and in speeches. They believe that television raises the level of political interest by graphic presentation of the news and by creating a closer contact between a candidate and viewer than can be provided by other media (Bendiner, 1952). Like commercial advertisers seeking higher sales, civic organizations attempt to stimulate turnout by heavy investments of their budgets and efforts in television. These hypotheses appear plausible: research before the age of television suggested that communications media are increasingly persuasive over attitudes and actions as they come closer to personal influence; (Klapper, 1949) and since television presents the viewer face-to-face with messengers and persuaders, one might think it peculiarly effective. Some early research provided apparent corroboration: as television watching rates increased among individuals, so did turnout (Bogart, 1958).

            Television acquaints many people with political information that they might have missed or underemphasized in the newspapers and over radio. Several studies have documented the immense public exposure to politics that has resulted form television, an exposure far greater than that achieved by previous media, particularly during presidential elections. (Janowitz and Marvick, 1956). The declining salience of political parties and the concurrent shift to candidate-centered media campaigns and voting patterns have raised fears of growing manipulation and instability in American politics. The mass media have usually been blamed for the apparently increasing “rootless ness” of the electorate and its abandonment of traditional voting patterns. Yet the evidence attributing these shifts to the media has been inconsistent of traditional voting patterns. Yet the evidence attributing these shifts to the media has been inconsistent.

            A recent review of research on “voter volatility” (Bybee, et al., 1981) concluded that “the vitality literature suggests that the emerging pattern of television as the dominant source of political information has contributed to growing electoral instability” (p.81). But the authors’ own study found no support for the hypothesis. If anything, television viewing was associated with lower rather than higher levels of vitality.

            A study of “candidate voting” (Wattenberg, 1982) found that while party salience is declining, and television is particularly indifferent to party labels, strong local party organizations can reverse the decline. Research on the role of media in children’s political socialization (Conway, et al., 1981) found that children’s media use and level of political knowledge had a negative relationship to supporting the party system. The authors called for “greater attention to the creative effects of observation and vicarious experience made possible through the news media” (p176).

            Politics and television have contracted an informal, mutually uneasy alliance of convenience in presidential election year. No candidate for high national or state office can afford to ignore a medium that reaches at least 98 per cent of all American households wired for electricity. And the networks must perforce devote a considerable amount of time to political speeches and to news coverage of the Democratic and Republican national conventions. Politics on television is costly-both to the candidates and to the broadcasters.

            Television has been praised for bringing the candidate and the voter into more intimate contact than was formerly possible. On the other hand, it is argued that TV tends to stress “image” at the expense of substance and thus to reward the facile candidate. Gene Wyckoff, a writer and producer of television films, supports that somewhat controversial view. In a new book on The Image Candidates: American Politics in the Age of Television, Wyckoff prophesies, moreover, that “American politics in high places at crucial moments, “a subtle increase of incompetence in high places at crucial moments, a subtle corrosion of our government’s traditional dedication to being representative of and responsive to a consensus of informed public opinion.” Voicing a more widely held view, Kenneth P. O’Donnell, former special assistant to John F. Kennedy, has asserted that while television “thrusts people into prominence,” they “must have the qualities of greatness” to remain there. “TV cannot manufacture them. It can only transmit what is there,” ( O’Donnell, 1966).

            Political telecasts impose a heavy financial burden on the networks as well as the candidates. In the 1960 presidential campaign, the networks provided free time valued at between $4 million and $5 million; the four Kennedy-Nixon debates accounted for around $2 million of that sum. Altogether, it has been estimated that the networks spent $20 million in 1960 on convention coverage, election-night coverage, newscasts, special programs, and free time for the candidates (Alexander, 1966). Color television coverage requires bulkier, more expensive cameras, videotape machines and lights. In addition, the networks have had to spend considerable money on development of small, hand-held color TV and cameras for use on the convention floor. All of the foregoing expenses could be reduced if the networks pooled their efforts in some way. Such action was recommended by an industry study group after the 1964 conventions, but the networks opted, as in past years, for competitive coverage.

            Political telecasts raise many problems besides that of cost. Even if money is plentiful, the candidate must concern himself with how best to present himself on television, when to do so, and how often. The major concern of the networks and of individual stations is compliance wit the equal-opportunity provision spelled out in Section 315 of the Communications Act.

            It is sometimes argued that the candidate most likely to succeed on television is the good-looking, smooth-talking type who may or may not possess any other qualifications for office. Some critics, according to Howard K. Smith, have evaluated past Presidents and concluded that “all the good ones would have been failures on TV.”

                        George Washington had imperfect dentures and would have looked ad sounded ridiculous; Thomas Jefferson had shifty eyes and would have appeared insincere and  sneaky; Abraham Lincoln was physically awkward and had a high voice and would have seemed a man of no depth. On this scale, the only President who would really have displayed the aspect of greatness would have been-Warren G. Harding! (Smith, 1966).

           Television has been credited with or blamed for advancing or blighting numerous political careers. Richard M. Nixon is one of the few politicians whose careers have been both helped and hurt by television. Nixon’s wan appearance in the first 1960 debate with Kennedy may, as noted, have cost him the election. But eight years earlier, the dramatic “Checkers” speech may have kept Nixon from being dropped from the Republican ticket headed by Gen. Eisenhower. The televised speech was an answer to charges that Nixon, then a senator from California, had accepted a “secret fund” from a group of supporters in his home state. Nixon admitted receiving $18,000, but he insisted that “Every penny of it was used to pay for political expenses that I did not think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.” (Nixon)

            Although television can be a formidable political weapon, it must be used with discretion. A new series of political debates might ease the network’s pre-emption problems. When the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates were announced, both parties relinquished substantial amounts of prime time previously reserved for political telecasts. From the network’s point of view, there are two additional advantages to debates between presidential nominees: (1) they cost less to produce than a quiz show; (2) they add to the prestige of television.

            Television is changing rapidly, and so is the TV audience. Viewers are ignoring broadcast schedules and watching programs via Internet “streams” and iPod downloads. Or they are “time-shifting” and skipping the commercials, using digital video recorders, such as TiVo, or video-on-demand television. Millions are also spending time watching user-generated video on sites such as YouTube. Many TV executives are wondering whether television can sustain its traditional approach to making money – “renting out” millions of viewers at a time to advertisers. For all the ferment, however, Americans are watching more television than ever, using the new devices not to avoid traditional TV but to catch up on shows they otherwise would have missed. There’s an atmosphere of experimentation and uncertainty in the industry reminiscent of the dot-com boom, but television and advertising executives insist that the future of TV is bright (Mann, 2007).

            Whether you’re a Democrat in mourning or a Republican in glee, the results from Election Day should not obscure an important shift in America’s civic life. New tools and practices born on the Internet have reached critical mass, enabling ordinary people to participate in processes that used to be closed to them. The new political technology works because it gives individuals a way to pool their time, attention and resources around causes they may hold in common-and to do it without needing to become a professional activist or wait for approval from any authority figure. Political campaigns are big business these days.

What was once “the largest industry in the world totally run by amateurs,” (Micah, 2004). has become a business dominated by outside professionals who sell their services to candidates. Nationally, consultants began to receive widespread attention with the publication of The Selling President, 1968, in which the author Joe McGinniss recounted the efforts of media consultants to remold the public image of Richard M. Nixon through television. In the early days, consultants advised candidates on every aspect of the campaign, from media advertisements to field operations. A recent directory of political consultants lists nearly two dozen types of services available to campaigns (Lang, 1954). There are people who work only on radio on television. Commercials, or who concentrate solely on selecting the best times to run commercials produced by others.

            Generally speaking, television is a good deal in the partisan news coverage. Television, moreover, has lessened public dependence on the printed media in political campaigns. As CB5 News President Sig Mickelson once pointed out, “Television has made a near-reality of what was once a politician’s idle dream of omnipresence, of being seen and heard by everyone at the same time,” (Mickelson, 1960).  In this sense, television has made the voter his own best judge of the candidates.

            There is doubt whether even grossly slanted news coverage influences many voters. Voting studies conducted in the days before television found that far from serving to convert the undecided, convince the independent or seduce to convert the  undecided, convince the independent or seduce the antagonist, the campaign of each party reached primarily the most partisan within its own ranks. The major function of the mass media, from the standpoint of the party, was to reinforce already formed preferences; the minor function was to reactivate dormant predispositions. Other observers have stressed the “cumulative impact” which political material in newspapers and on the air ay have on voters, leading over a period of time to changes in voting patterns (Lang, 1959). Most politicians cling to the belief that the mass media are powerful instruments of persuasion. And they prefer even a hostile press to an inattentive press.

There is an old campaign aphorism that goes: “When they stop writing about you in politics, you are dead.”

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