Was The Charles The Bald Any Less Successful A Ruler Than Any Of His 8th Century Predeces

The concept of successful rulership in the Carolingian period is a complex one. Clearly, a simplistic view of success based primarily on territorial power is inadequate. The maintenance of internal or administrative power is crucial, especially in terms of the aristocracy and the church. Success in the Carolingian period is a multi-faceted concept. When comparing the relative successes of rulers in this period, as in any other, it is vital to display an understanding of the differing contexts of different reigns. As we shall see the context of Charles the Bald’s reign was fundamentally different to his 8th century predecessors.

It is hard to deny that Charles the Bald’s Carolingian predecessors in the 8th century were individually successful. The size of the Carolingian empire at its height in 806 had reached 1,200,000 square km. Charles Martel, Pippin and of course Charlemagne all played their part in creating this vast realm. Charles Martel created the foundations for the Carolingian dynasty with his internal seizure of power. This internal power was consolidated with successful campaigns fought against Bavaria, Aquitaine and Burgundy. Pippin, Martel’s successor, continued to enlarge the empire.

His ceaseless campaigning, which as we will discuss later fostered aristocratic support, strengthened Frankish power to the east of the Rhine. Annual campaigns against the Saxons and Aquitaines also highlight Pippin’s energy and determination. More importantly Pippin continued the process of legitimising Carolingian rule. In return for support in Lombardy Pope Stephen II publicly legitimised Carolingian rule. Pippin acted on an internal level with administrative reforms. These included the reinstitution of ecclesiastical immunities and the creation of Frankish diocesan structures east of the Rhine.

Martel and Pippin had prepared the spring board for Charlemagne’s magnificent conquests. The defeat and conversion to Christianity of the Saxons, the plundering of the Avars and the conquest of Lombardy are but three of Charlemagne’s major military achievements. These achievements are coupled with a further strengthening, or legitimising of power which culminated in Charlemagne’s coronation as emperor in Rome on Christmas day 800. Despite the fantastic achievements of the 8th century Carolingians it would be wrong to state that their reigns were entirely successful.

It took a long time for the Saxons to be beaten and the mass deportations and enforced conversions hardly reflect well on a man as overtly religious as Charlemagne. Charlemagne’s administrative reforms were of dubious success. Yes, the capitularies and decrees imply a new and efficient administrative structure with missi and counts supplying localised but accountable government. However the evidence for the success of these reforms is scarce. Charlemagne never mastered living in peace and he began to find it difficult to recruit military followings during the latter part of his reign.

There is no doubt that the 8th century predecessors of Charles the Bald were successful, but their success is by no means as clear as their territorial gains would suggest. The treaty of Verdun in 843 and the fragmentation of the Carolingian empire during Charles’ minority meant that Charles had little room for imperial expansion. The southern border with Spain was of course open, but not even Charlemagne had been totally successful in the difficult conditions of the Pyrenees. The treaty of Verdun and the lack of a truly dominant ruler led to an ephemeral map of the Carolingian regna between 843 and 879.

Charles was never to have the same opportunities for imperial expansion as his 8th century predecessors. Who was there left to defeat? A lack of naval power meant that the Danes and Anglo-Saxons would remain out of reach, whilst expeditions to the south in Spain were notoriously difficult and reliant on the unreliable Gascons and Basques. This is not say that Charles was completely lacking in military acumen. The lack of an open frontier exposed Charles to rebellion and the naturally predatory instincts of the other members of the Carolingian empire.

Charles had to work hard to defeat Pippin II in Aquitaine, whilst facing threats from his eastern kin in 854 and 858. Similarly Charles had to face the obligatory rebellions from his own sons in the 860s and 870s. It would be wrong to outline a purely defensive military resume however. Charles always acted quickly on the crises in his kinsmen’s kingdoms. For example, Charles took Aachen from Louis the German in 869 and Lotharingia in 876. At the time of his death Charles was close to securing full control on Lombardy and reasserting full control in the Frankish heartlands.

The context of Charles’s succession meant that glorious imperial expansion was nigh on impossible. However, Charles did not disgrace himself in the less glorious tasks of internal power conflict and defensio patriae. The lack of opportunity for imperial expansion had serious consequences for Charles the Bald’s kingdoms. Plunder and tribute accumulated from raids and conquests had sustained not only Charles’ predecessors, but also their aristocratic supporters. The rewards from expansionary warfare benefited the warriors involved but also the King.

Reuter argues for a centralised accumulation and distribution of plunder in the Carolingian age. The widespread dispersal of the immense Avar loot to Ireland, Rome and Britain is testament to this. Plunder and tribute (institutionalised plunder) clearly added to the royal fisc. These resources were not simply hoarded by the King but distributed to his followers as a reward for loyalty and service. Reuter sees a large-scale circulation of acquired goods largely controlled by the King. Whilst the benefits of war were greater than the perceived costs or risks of war the raising of armies was a relatively easy affair.

The acquisition of loot by successful warfare was crucial in determining the momentum of Frankish expansion and the allocation of power within the Frankish kingdom. The aristocracy were always likely to support a leader that led them to and redistributed the spoils of war. However if the costs of war outweighed the benefits of war the rulers would find it hard to muster large armies. As aristocratic wealth increased the risk of leaving it unguarded in the search for ever decreasing rewards heightened. We see opposition to some of Pippin’s campaigns for similar reasons.

It has often been stated that a general climate of factionalism, military stagnation and declining moral standards contributed to the internal traumas of the 9th century. These factors were certainly important, but it would be wrong to suggest that they were 9th century phenomenon. They had existed in Merovingian Gaul and, as Retuer pertinently points out, they had existed in 8th century Francia as well. Reuter argues that these elements existed but were not exposed when the empire was expanding and bringing in resources. It is no wonder therefore that we find Charles the Bald reforming his internal administrative and court structures.

The inflow of resources from aboard, or the current account, of his treasury had faltered in comparison to his predecessors. Charles had to find new ways of consoling the needs of the aristocracy whilst funding the defence of his land. A defence that lacked the overwhelming support of his predecessors campaigns. With the external source of income drained Charles had to draw on “internal plunder” to fund the network of personalised relationships that bound his kingdom together. Without another source of income Charles reign was doomed to failure. Charles fisc would only placate the nobility for so long.

As Nelson explains there were other sources of wealth within Charles’ kingdom. The polyptychs from the period show a rising population and the emergence of a manorial system of agriculture. Evidence also points to a more cash based economy where surpluses were sold at an increasing number of markets. The combination of increased coinage, increasing productivity and increasing population point to economic growth. Whether or not Charles knowingly exploited this upturn is in some ways irrelevant, but he certainly did not discourage it. Charles granted twenty-five charters for markets in his kingdom.

He utilised these charters, and the increased diffusion of trading posts, to exact revenue. This increased control of markets enabled institutionalised taxation. We see Charles taxing even small market traders in 877 as a means of funding the Vikings defences. Charles’ predecessors never had recourse to introduce such measures, but this does not necessarily reflect badly on Charles. Surely the ability to impose and manage such a scheme highlights a certain air of control and authority. The renovation monetae of 864 is another demonstration of Charles’ political will.

For the King the recoinage was in essence a realm wide form of taxation. He was after all in charge of the majority of mints. Moreover the higher the quality of coinage the higher the value of the levies that he extracted from his vast lands. The quality of trade and coinage after 864 can be seen in the lack of foreign coin in Francia and the appearance of Charles’ coinage in Scandinavia. The higher value currency also allowed the monasteries and church at large to continue in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. The economic effect of the Vikings’ raid is hard to pin down.

On the one hand the systematic destruction and ravaging undertaken on these raids cannot have been healthy, but the Vikings provided a market as well as a threat. Similarly a willing aristocracy snapped up lands lost by the church in Aquitaine. It was by an exaggeration to credit Charles with a progressive economic policy, but it would not be over stating the case to suggest that he understood and carefully exploited the new forms of commercial activity in his realm. Historians have traditionally viewed Charles the Bald as a squanderer of the royal fisc and the Carolingian that did most to fragment Gaul.

Dohndt argued that by institutionalising hereditary countships Charles created overly powerful regional magnates. These regional magnates he argues were to form the basis of the 12th century houses of France. Whilst it is true that Charles’ more powerful magnates did form the basis for these 12th century house the path is by no means direct. Yes, Charles promoted Robert the Strong, but he also disinherited his two sons. It was not until after Charles had died that Robert’s kin began to reassert themselves. Secondly, the hereditary nature of administrative positions had been established well before Charles’ reign.

Dhondt’s tidy territorial model is belied by the footloose nature of the potentes. Robert the Strong was no stranger to moving around Charles’ realm seeking the power that came from being close to the king: a notion German historians have coined “konigsnahe”. We cannot deny however that Charles strengthened the position of the aristocracy. As his royal predecessors before him Charles was not shy in handing out dispositions or honores. Charles was also partial to appointing lay abbots. In this way Charles secured political and military service without damage to the royal fisc. The incumbent was strictly a life tenant.

Charles got a high yield from the patronage of the church. Hincmar of Rhiems takes pride in the military support that the church provides to Charles. The relationship was not one-way however. Charles had to work with the ecclesiastical grain. Charles was not shy in responding to papal pleas for help. Charles the Bald certainly cultivated aristocratic support and he may well have increased their power, but to suggest that this was the start of the fragmentation of Gaul would be wrong. Charles, limited by circumstance and financial constraints, needed aristocratic support as all kings did.

With the expansion path closed how else was Charles supposed to guarantee this support? In imperial terms Charles the Bald was less successful than his 8th century predecessors. He lacked the opportunity to execute grandiose expansionary schemes. It was these expansionary schemes that had contributed to his predecessors’ aristocratic support in the previous century. Unprofitable defensio patriae was never likely to generate the same powerful support. As we have seen this support was a fundamental feature of the power dynamic in Carolingian times.

We should not blame Charles for the apparent increase in internal disputes, but instead praise him for the efforts he made in solidifying his own support with a combination of new and more traditional tools. When comparing Charles and 8th century Kings we are not comparing like and like. The contexts of the different periods vary greatly and it would be rash to compare directly the success of the different rulers. Therefore it would be to belie Charles’ achievements to suggest that he was inferior to his 8th century predecessors. The concept of successful rulership in the Carolingian period is a complex one.

Clearly, a simplistic view of success based primarily on territorial power is inadequate. The maintenance of internal or administrative power is crucial, especially in terms of the aristocracy and the church. Success in the Carolingian period is a multi-faceted concept. When comparing the relative successes of rulers in this period, as in any other, it is vital to display an understanding of the differing contexts of different reigns. As we shall see the context of Charles the Bald’s reign was fundamentally different to his 8th century predecessors.

It is hard to deny that Charles the Bald’s Carolingian predecessors in the 8th century were individually successful. The size of the Carolingian empire at its height in 806 had reached 1,200,000 square km. Charles Martel, Pippin and of course Charlemagne all played their part in creating this vast realm. Charles Martel created the foundations for the Carolingian dynasty with his internal seizure of power. This internal power was consolidated with successful campaigns fought against Bavaria, Aquitaine and Burgundy. Pippin, Martel’s successor, continued to enlarge the empire.

His ceaseless campaigning, which as we will discuss later fostered aristocratic support, strengthened Frankish power to the east of the Rhine. Annual campaigns against the Saxons and Aquitaines also highlight Pippin’s energy and determination. More importantly Pippin continued the process of legitimising Carolingian rule. In return for support in Lombardy Pope Stephen II publicly legitimised Carolingian rule. Pippin acted on an internal level with administrative reforms. These included the reinstitution of ecclesiastical immunities and the creation of Frankish diocesan structures east of the Rhine.

Martel and Pippin had prepared the spring board for Charlemagne’s magnificent conquests. The defeat and conversion to Christianity of the Saxons, the plundering of the Avars and the conquest of Lombardy are but three of Charlemagne’s major military achievements. These achievements are coupled with a further strengthening, or legitimising of power which culminated in Charlemagne’s coronation as emperor in Rome on Christmas day 800. Despite the fantastic achievements of the 8th century Carolingians it would be wrong to state that their reigns were entirely successful.

It took a long time for the Saxons to be beaten and the mass deportations and enforced conversions hardly reflect well on a man as overtly religious as Charlemagne. Charlemagne’s administrative reforms were of dubious success. Yes, the capitularies and decrees imply a new and efficient administrative structure with missi and counts supplying localised but accountable government. However the evidence for the success of these reforms is scarce. Charlemagne never mastered living in peace and he began to find it difficult to recruit military followings during the latter part of his reign.

There is no doubt that the 8th century predecessors of Charles the Bald were successful, but their success is by no means as clear as their territorial gains would suggest. The treaty of Verdun in 843 and the fragmentation of the Carolingian empire during Charles’ minority meant that Charles had little room for imperial expansion. The southern border with Spain was of course open, but not even Charlemagne had been totally successful in the difficult conditions of the Pyrenees. The treaty of Verdun and the lack of a truly dominant ruler led to an ephemeral map of the Carolingian regna between 843 and 879.

Charles was never to have the same opportunities for imperial expansion as his 8th century predecessors. Who was there left to defeat? A lack of naval power meant that the Danes and Anglo-Saxons would remain out of reach, whilst expeditions to the south in Spain were notoriously difficult and reliant on the unreliable Gascons and Basques. This is not say that Charles was completely lacking in military acumen. The lack of an open frontier exposed Charles to rebellion and the naturally predatory instincts of the other members of the Carolingian empire.

Charles had to work hard to defeat Pippin II in Aquitaine, whilst facing threats from his eastern kin in 854 and 858. Similarly Charles had to face the obligatory rebellions from his own sons in the 860s and 870s. It would be wrong to outline a purely defensive military resume however. Charles always acted quickly on the crises in his kinsmen’s kingdoms. For example, Charles took Aachen from Louis the German in 869 and Lotharingia in 876. At the time of his death Charles was close to securing full control on Lombardy and reasserting full control in the Frankish heartlands.

The context of Charles’s succession meant that glorious imperial expansion was nigh on impossible. However, Charles did not disgrace himself in the less glorious tasks of internal power conflict and defensio patriae. The lack of opportunity for imperial expansion had serious consequences for Charles the Bald’s kingdoms. Plunder and tribute accumulated from raids and conquests had sustained not only Charles’ predecessors, but also their aristocratic supporters. The rewards from expansionary warfare benefited the warriors involved but also the King.

Reuter argues for a centralised accumulation and distribution of plunder in the Carolingian age. The widespread dispersal of the immense Avar loot to Ireland, Rome and Britain is testament to this. Plunder and tribute (institutionalised plunder) clearly added to the royal fisc. These resources were not simply hoarded by the King but distributed to his followers as a reward for loyalty and service. Reuter sees a large-scale circulation of acquired goods largely controlled by the King. Whilst the benefits of war were greater than the perceived costs or risks of war the raising of armies was a relatively easy affair.

The acquisition of loot by successful warfare was crucial in determining the momentum of Frankish expansion and the allocation of power within the Frankish kingdom. The aristocracy were always likely to support a leader that led them to and redistributed the spoils of war. However if the costs of war outweighed the benefits of war the rulers would find it hard to muster large armies. As aristocratic wealth increased the risk of leaving it unguarded in the search for ever decreasing rewards heightened. We see opposition to some of Pippin’s campaigns for similar reasons.

It has often been stated that a general climate of factionalism, military stagnation and declining moral standards contributed to the internal traumas of the 9th century. These factors were certainly important, but it would be wrong to suggest that they were 9th century phenomenon. They had existed in Merovingian Gaul and, as Retuer pertinently points out, they had existed in 8th century Francia as well. Reuter argues that these elements existed but were not exposed when the empire was expanding and bringing in resources. It is no wonder therefore that we find Charles the Bald reforming his internal administrative and court structures.

The inflow of resources from aboard, or the current account, of his treasury had faltered in comparison to his predecessors. Charles had to find new ways of consoling the needs of the aristocracy whilst funding the defence of his land. A defence that lacked the overwhelming support of his predecessors campaigns. With the external source of income drained Charles had to draw on “internal plunder” to fund the network of personalised relationships that bound his kingdom together. Without another source of income Charles reign was doomed to failure. Charles fisc would only placate the nobility for so long.

As Nelson explains there were other sources of wealth within Charles’ kingdom. The polyptychs from the period show a rising population and the emergence of a manorial system of agriculture. Evidence also points to a more cash based economy where surpluses were sold at an increasing number of markets. The combination of increased coinage, increasing productivity and increasing population point to economic growth. Whether or not Charles knowingly exploited this upturn is in some ways irrelevant, but he certainly did not discourage it. Charles granted twenty-five charters for markets in his kingdom.

He utilised these charters, and the increased diffusion of trading posts, to exact revenue. This increased control of markets enabled institutionalised taxation. We see Charles taxing even small market traders in 877 as a means of funding the Vikings defences. Charles’ predecessors never had recourse to introduce such measures, but this does not necessarily reflect badly on Charles. Surely the ability to impose and manage such a scheme highlights a certain air of control and authority. The renovation monetae of 864 is another demonstration of Charles’ political will.

For the King the recoinage was in essence a realm wide form of taxation. He was after all in charge of the majority of mints. Moreover the higher the quality of coinage the higher the value of the levies that he extracted from his vast lands. The quality of trade and coinage after 864 can be seen in the lack of foreign coin in Francia and the appearance of Charles’ coinage in Scandinavia. The higher value currency also allowed the monasteries and church at large to continue in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. The economic effect of the Vikings’ raid is hard to pin down.

On the one hand the systematic destruction and ravaging undertaken on these raids cannot have been healthy, but the Vikings provided a market as well as a threat. Similarly a willing aristocracy snapped up lands lost by the church in Aquitaine. It was by an exaggeration to credit Charles with a progressive economic policy, but it would not be over stating the case to suggest that he understood and carefully exploited the new forms of commercial activity in his realm. Historians have traditionally viewed Charles the Bald as a squanderer of the royal fisc and the Carolingian that did most to fragment Gaul.

Dohndt argued that by institutionalising hereditary countships Charles created overly powerful regional magnates. These regional magnates he argues were to form the basis of the 12th century houses of France. Whilst it is true that Charles’ more powerful magnates did form the basis for these 12th century house the path is by no means direct. Yes, Charles promoted Robert the Strong, but he also disinherited his two sons. It was not until after Charles had died that Robert’s kin began to reassert themselves. Secondly, the hereditary nature of administrative positions had been established well before Charles’ reign.

Dhondt’s tidy territorial model is belied by the footloose nature of the potentes. Robert the Strong was no stranger to moving around Charles’ realm seeking the power that came from being close to the king: a notion German historians have coined “konigsnahe”. We cannot deny however that Charles strengthened the position of the aristocracy. As his royal predecessors before him Charles was not shy in handing out dispositions or honores. Charles was also partial to appointing lay abbots. In this way Charles secured political and military service without damage to the royal fisc. The incumbent was strictly a life tenant.

Charles got a high yield from the patronage of the church. Hincmar of Rhiems takes pride in the military support that the church provides to Charles. The relationship was not one-way however. Charles had to work with the ecclesiastical grain. Charles was not shy in responding to papal pleas for help. Charles the Bald certainly cultivated aristocratic support and he may well have increased their power, but to suggest that this was the start of the fragmentation of Gaul would be wrong. Charles, limited by circumstance and financial constraints, needed aristocratic support as all kings did.

With the expansion path closed how else was Charles supposed to guarantee this support? In imperial terms Charles the Bald was less successful than his 8th century predecessors. He lacked the opportunity to execute grandiose expansionary schemes. It was these expansionary schemes that had contributed to his predecessors’ aristocratic support in the previous century. Unprofitable defensio patriae was never likely to generate the same powerful support. As we have seen this support was a fundamental feature of the power dynamic in Carolingian times.

We should not blame Charles for the apparent increase in internal disputes, but instead praise him for the efforts he made in solidifying his own support with a combination of new and more traditional tools. When comparing Charles and 8th century Kings we are not comparing like and like. The contexts of the different periods vary greatly and it would be rash to compare directly the success of the different rulers. Therefore it would be to belie Charles’ achievements to suggest that he was inferior to his 8th century predecessors.