An Overview of Muslim Scholars’ Perspective

The problem of free will and determinism is both old and complex. From the early days of human civilization men reflected on it and formed their opinions about its various aspects. The Greek philosophers, Socrates (470-399 BC), Plato (427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) concentrated on the internal capacity of man to find the truth of practical good.1 The medieval Christian dogmatism led man to despair as he had no freedom to enquire about the authority and had to suffer for the ‘original sin’.2 The Renaissance thinkers of Europe like Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Rene’ Descartes (1596-1650) and Leibniz (1646-1716) focused more on the rational mechanism of the universe than on the spirituo-ethical reality of man. The propounders of Enlightenment and empirical science revolved round the material progress and happiness in the world of cause and effect, thus ignoring the role of transcendental or spiritual powers.3 To many of them man is subject to cosmic physical determinism, which, in consequence, restricts his domain of activity.

Islam, the primordial and revealed religion of God for all-embracing guidance of mankind, treats the problem of free will and determinism in totality. In the history of Islam scholars have dealt with it in various dimensions and paradigms. Its conspicuous rise was during the period of Umayyads and it continued to stimulate the scholars of subsequent times. Here an attempt is made to look into the early rise of the problem and its treatment by the Muslim theologians and scholars of the medieval and the modern times. However the focus will be on the main theme and on the representative personalities only.

Early Rise of the Problem
During the time of Prophet Muhammad (may Allah’s peace be upon him) the people who belonged to other religions as well as polytheists were engaged with the problem of destiny (taqdir). They used to ask twisted
* Senior Lecturer, Shah-i-Hamadan Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, 190006.

questions to Muslims about Allah—His Essence and Attributes. They, out of evil designs, attributed acts of their polytheism to God.5 The Qur’an addresses their queries and characterises such men as followers of conjecture (zun) rather than knowledge: Those who are bent on ascribing divinity to aught beside God will say, “Had God so Willed, we would not have ascribed divinity to aught but Him nor would our forefathers [have done so]; and neither would we have declared as forbidden anything [that He has allowed].” Even so did those who lived before them give the lie to the truth—until they came to taste Our punishment! Say: “Have you any [certain knowledge which you could proffer to us? You follow but [other people’s] conjectures, and you yourself do nothing but guess.”

Even the question of destiny struck the minds of some of the Prophet’s companions (sahabah) and they were told to believe in it rather than have discussions on it. It is reported through the various well known narraters of Traditions (ahadith) that once when the Prophet (SAAWS) saw some Companions discussing destiny (taqdir) he got offended and forbade them from doing so.7 He advised them that it does not belong to such matters of Shari’ah (Islamic Law) about which they have to form their opinion definitely. He added that it is better to remain calm than to discuss it which might lead to harm.8 This refrainment from the discussion is even found in the Prophet’s attitude which he showed when he visited the house of Hazrat ‘Ali (RA) and Fatima (RA) during a night enquiring them about their failure to offer tahajjud (additional night prayer). In his reply Hazrat ‘Ali seemed to attribue their failure to Allah who made him not to rise up for tahjud that night. This displeased the Prophet (SAAW) who left their house by mentioning the following verse of the Qur’an:

But man is, in most things, contentious.

It was, however, through the interaction with and influences of the other religions and philosophers that the problem of destiny became the subject of debate and discussion during the Ummayad period of Islamic history. Two groups or schools of thought emerged during this period. One is called Qadariyyah and the other Jabariyyah. Qadariyyah was founded by Ma’bad ibn Khalid al-Juhani (b. 699). The school took its name from the view that man has the capacity to action and qadar or qudrah—is responsible for his deeds. He was succeeded by Gylan ibn Dimishqi in leading the school who preached the following principles:

1) Man is free and the author of his own actions.
2) God will reckon with man on the day of Judgement and reward him for good deeds and punish him for bad deeds. 3) Iman (belief) is the consequences of knowledge and understanding. 4)The grave sinner is indeed a Muslim yet God will surely punish him on the day of Judgement.

Contrary to this was the school of Jabariyyah— the school of fatalism. Its founder was Jahm ibn Safwan (127/745). The group is also known by the name of its founder as Jahimiyyah. It propounded the following doctrines: 1)Man is determined by God in all his actions, including the acts of faith, faithlessness, good and evil. In support of this, the group quoted the following verses of the Qur’an:

Verily, all this is an admonition: whoever, then so wills, may unto His sustainer find a way. But you cannot will it unless God wills [to show you that way]: for behold, God is indeed all-seeing, wise”

2)Paradise is not eternal.
3)The vision of Allah on the day of Judgement is possible.

Both these groups were disapproved of by the Muslim community (ummah) for their rigid, extremist and heretical stands. Qadariyyah regard man absolutely free in his actions and reject the role of any other power or powers. Jabariyyah, on the other hand, characterise man’s actions as rigidly fatalistic, determined by God, reducing man a passive agent. The doctrine displacing man from his proper status by rigid fatalism of Jabariyyah and the irresponsible and absolute freedom posted to man by Qadariyyah both met with a general rejection under the Ummayad rulers particularly ‘Umar ibn Abdul Aziz and Hasham ibn Abdul Malik.14 This prompted the refutation of these schools by Traditionists (muhadithun) and the jurists (fuqaha) of the age.

The Mutakalimun (Theologians) Schools’ Treatment
During the age of Abbasids it were the mutakalimun (theologians) schools particularly Mu’tazilah15 and Ash’ariah16 which among other things relating to Islamic teachings, tackled the problem of free will and determinism as well. Although the Mu‘tazilah school resembles the Qadrriyyah in some respects yet on the whole it maintained its special character through the doctrines of Tawhid (unity of God), justice and enjoining of good (ma’ruf) and forbidding the evil (munkar).17 In their doctrine of justice Mu’tazilah designate man as the author of his own actions. If it is not so, they claim, then he cannot be called free and responsible for his actions. To them freedom is basic to the whole of religion and its enterprise. They put-forth five arguments in its support which are related to moral obligation, prophethood, revelation, divine justice, omnigoodness of God and the rationality of good and evil. All these axioms, they claim,18 are essential and imply freedom and capacity of action otherwise everything will be reduced to absurdity.

On the other hand, the Ash’ariah took the intermediary position between Jabariyah and Mu’tazilah. Their stand is based on their making a distinction between khalq (creation) and kasb (acquisition) and the two categories of power — qadimah and hadithah. According to them, God is the creator (khaliq) of actions and man is the acquisitor (muktasib). ‘Action of human beings are created by God, the creatures are not capable of creating any action.’ While classifying power into the categories of original (qadimah) and derived (hadithah), the Asha’riah say that it is the original power that creates and not the derived power. Man is given power by God so it is derived. The true meaning of acquisition, according to the Ash’ariah, is the occurrence of a thing or event due to derived power and it is an acquisition for the person by whose derived power it takes.19 As such God is the creator of human actions and man the acquisitor.

Man cannot create or initiate work. God alone can do it as it is His progative. God creates in man the power to do an act and also gives him an ability to make a free choice (ikhtiyar) between the two alternatives— right and wrong. The free choice is not yet effective in performing the action because it is the habit or nature of Allah (sunnat al-Allah) that creates action by corresponding to power of choice in man.20 Thus, according to the Ash’ariah, man’s action is created by God. Man is free in making the choice and intending to do the act he acquires (ikhtisab), the merit of appreciation and demerit of condemnation i.e. reward for good choice and punishment for wrong choice.

To avoid fatalism the Ash’ar’iah have introduced the doctrine of acquisition (iktisab) by which man is, however, different from that conceived by Mu’tazilah who attribute real power to man while in the Ash’ariah doctrine, man has no real and effective power but has the derived power to share in the production of an act. According to Ash’ariah, God creates in two ways—either with locus (mahal) or without it. Human actions are God’s creation with locus. “God creates in man the power, ability, choice and will to perform an act, and man endowed with this derived power, chooses freely one of the alternatives and intends or wills to do the actions corresponding to his intentions, God creates and completes the action. “26 So Ash‘ariah try to reconcile the two rigid positions of Mu‘tazilah and Jabariyyah while granting man freedom of action (ikhtiyar al-amali) in a limited way reserving the absolute power of producing an act with God.22

The Treatment of Medieval Scholars: al-Ghazzali and Shah Wali Allah
Notwithstanding the mutakalimun discourses on the problem of free will and determinism, many medieval scholars also have treated the problem. A mention of the views of al-Ghazzali and Shah Wali Allah will suffice here for our analysis.

Al-Ghazzali23 dicusses freedom of will in terms of his concept of change in an individual and society. His main contentions are the following: 1.Since the individual being has the capacity to change his conduct, he can be called a free person though, according to al-Ghazzali, the change in some persons is stifled either through their ignorance or greater habituation of their passions in the past. In case of the former, change is possible if the person is guided while as the latter is not prone to it due to the hardness of his corrupted heart.24 About such people God has said: God has sealed their hearts and their hearing, and over their eyes is a veil; and grave suffering awaits them.25 2.Instruction, exhortation, education and self discipline would become meaningless if man is not given freedom. It is of secondary importance, says Ghazzali, that change in the character of man corresponds to the state of his heart.26 3.It is because of the capacity of freedom in man that he can rise to the higher stages of morality and spiritual progress i.e. from insinuative self (an-nafs al ammarah) to the reproaching self (an-nafs al-lawwamah) and from this to self a peace (an-nafs al-mutamainah).

The first stage of insinuating self is wholly evil, overpowered by passion. The light of reason does not prevail here and man cannot distinguish between the higher and the lowerself. The Qur’an calls this self an nafs al-ammarah.

The second stage— the reproaching self— is an unsettled stage between good and evil in which man is in a constant struggle. Sometimes he is under the dominance of one and sometimes under the other. So he is doing both good and evil yet he can make a clear distinction between the lower and the higher self. The Qur’an calls this self an-nafs al-lawwammah.

The third stage is fixedly good with illuminated consciousness. Here man acts according to the dictates of reason and renders the evil elements in him ineffective. At this stage the destructive qualities are eliminated and constructive qualities are cultivated. Man loses the sight of first two stages and the higher self which is the true self or consciousness becomes his master. The Qur’an calls it an-nafs al-mutmainah.

Furthermore, al-Ghazzali elaborates the subject in the light of his description of the three worlds— the physical world (alam al-mulk), the mental world (alam al-jabrut) and the spiritual world (alam al-malakut) vis-a-vis the operation of will in man.28 According to al-Ghazzali impressions and ideas which he calls al-khwatir enter the internal and the external senses and affect the human heart. This makes the shift in heart from one state to other. Whatever the heart intends or resolves that first comes to it as thought and then leads to human action. The action operates through the stages (i) inclination or impulses (ar-raghbah) (ii) the process of intellect or conviction (i’tiqad) and (iii) the stage of will (iradah).29 To Ghazzali the idea and impulse is not under the complete control of man because they are affected by the cosmic forces namely the angelic and the satanic forces.

By nature the heart is equally susceptible to the angelic as well as the satanic influences. The divine element is guided by reason (al-aql) while the satanic element is guided by appetition (ash-shawwah). Ash-Shawah and self-assertion (ghazab) inhabit in man’s flesh and blood and through them evil can rule the heart. However, when they are brought, says al-Ghazzali, under the control of reason, the heart become the abode of the angelic influences.30 Man, therefore, has the freedom of forming his character, producing acts but at the various stages of its operation he is subject to the factors which are not under his full control. The impressions and ideas which motivate man to will and act come to him from the various forces of cosmos. However, when the impressions (al-khawatir) are translated into action the man enjoys his choice (ikhtiyar).

Shah Wali Allah31 another outstanding medieval scholar, discusses the issue of determinism and free will in his description of taqdir and taklif. To him qadar (power) is related to God’s attribute of power and will. Unlike the ordinary minds who out of their frustatration experience or innate ideas say that things are predetermined, the prophets and great seers apprehend the unity of the whole universe.32 This unity is governed by one universal scheme (al-tadbir al wahdani) that is determined by God’s Eternal Will and Power. Nothing can go at the slightest variance with it.33 The universal scheme is realised through sunnat al-Allah— God’s ordained mode of doing things. The occurrence of things, says the Shah, and their evolution from one state to the other represent this sunnah (law) of God. The transformation or evolution becomes possible only when they have potentiality and capacity (isti’dad) for it which they owe to the bounty of Allah—al-Rehman.34 The things which ordinarily happen day to day are actually present in the eternal scheme that transcend, this space and time. According to him, species of things differ in their characteristics and behaviour, modes of development and emergence etc. The peculiar cause of things produces the peculiar effect. Things go with their routine system of God’s pattern without haphazardness and chaos. All these characteristics and laws, and the variety of different species of things are the creation of God, determined by His Will.

Shah Wali Allah illustrates man’s freedom through the concept of taklif (responsibility). It is the responsibility of accepting the Trust (amanah) of God that provides man to choose between various alternative. This choice is given to him in the phenomenal world where he takes one course of action and discards the other. He exercises it because he has appropriation for it which is wanting both in the angels and the other creatures of cosmos.36 About this, the verse of the Qur’an amplifies as following: Verily, We offered the trust to the heavens and the earth, and the mountains but they declined to bear it and shrank from it. But man undertook it.

Man’s undertaking the Trust vindicates his volition for emerging as a responsible and answerable person. Through this freedom of he chooses things which are agreeable or un-agreeable to his nature or consciousness. According to Wali Allah, it leaves perpetual effect on his thought and conduct and leading either to happiness (sa’adah) or unhappiness (zillah).38 Yet this freedom is at the level of phenomenal environment and in the eternal scheme of God, it is fixed and determined. Man cannot act differently from what has been predetermined in this Higher order (al-Nizam al-fauqani).

Modern Scholars’ Treatment
In the modern times the problem of free will and determinism has been treated by a number of Muslim scholars. Significant among them are Allama Shibli Nu‘mani (1857-1914)39, Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), M.M. Pickthal40, Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979),41 Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi (d.1987)42 and Fazlur Rehman (d.1988)43. Here we shall focus on the views of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal about the subject.

Dr. Mohammad Iqbal was well versed in both the Islamic and the Western traditions of thought and his treatment of the problem is very profound. His views are occasionally expressed in his The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam and also find place in some of his poetical works. He elaborates the subject in his concept of ‘ego’ (self) and taqdir (destiny).

According to Iqbal, the ultimate reality is free and creative and it is manifested in the self of man—ego. He says that freedom is the very essence of Absolute Divine Will that creates and expands things in the universe. Man emerges as the unique creation of God and acts as His deputy and ‘co-worker’.

The ego’s freedom, according to Iqbal, is amplified by providing it with the environment of cause and effect. It gives life to the ego and the life itself involves freedom. It is, therefore, the very necessity of the ego: The ego is called upon to live in complex environment and cannot maintain his life in it without reducing it to a system which would give him some kind of assurance as to the behaviour of things around him. The view of his environment of cause and effect is thus an indispensable instrument of the ego, and not a final expression of the nature of Reality. Indeed is interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom.

To Iqbal, ego is determined from within. He rejects physical determinism and views the ego as a growing and changing reality. It is not restricted to mere choice between the predetermined courses but decides its future course by itself. It is the centre of free will, dynamic force and creative powers. Placing it in causal chains or the external impositions is the artificial construction for understanding and actualising its purposes. These practical aspects of the ego are necessary for its growth and enrichment. Gradually it, says Iqbal, rises above these spatio-temporal impositions.

Iqbal, however, elucidates that the ego activity is not entirely undetermined. It is determined by an All-inclusive and All comprehensive unity, Divine Dynamic Ego God and His creative existence reveals His eternal possibilities. The multifarious existence, colourful and divergent aspects of reality reveal eternal Divine power. God creates the objects and makes multiplicity emerge from them. To each object, He assigns its ‘destiny’.46 Destiny or determinism (taqdir) in Iqbal, is not in conflict with ‘pure duration’ which is described as the eternal possibility for the creative activity of man. It is not also an unrelenting fate but the possibilities in man foreseen by Omniscient Creator. Iqbal explains it thus: Destiny is time regarded as prior to disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence— the diagrammatic character which the logical understanding imposes on it. In one word it is time as felt and not as thought calculated… it is an inward reach of a thing, its realisable possibilities which lie within the depths of nature, and serially actualise themselves without any feeling of external compulsion.

The destiny, prescribed by God, signifies here immense powers and capabilities which give man the scope of freedom, initiative and originality. He has an active participation in the creative activity of God as a finite ego. In him ego-hood reaches its perfection and achieves a higher place in the realm of existence. “Of all the creatures of God, he alone is capable of consciously participating in the creative life of his maker. Endowed with the power to imagine a better world and to mould what is into, what ought to be, the ego in him aspires, in the interest of an increasingly unique and comprehensive individuality, to exploit all the various environments on which he may be called upon to operate during the course of an endless career.”By virtue of physical and spiritual powers suitably adjusted with his faculties, man is capable to act as well as modify his personality and surroundings. His love for struggle signifies the self-expression from one stage of being to another. According to Iqbal, it depends upon man to use or not to use these powers, endowed to him by God. By using them, nontheless he evolves and enriches his being and God even becomes a co-worker with him in this whole progressive change. If he won’t use it, his whole being will be reduced to the level of a dead matter.

Destiny, hence, assigns man freedom of action and brings before him an infinite career. His is the private initiative and God helps him by His Divine Grace and command to actualise it. This concept of destiny, in Iqbal, has no place for passive resignation to fate or fatalism. Man is not here helpless before an unrelenting fate working from without. He is, of course, a moral agent having his own choice to tread the path of perfection, Divine vicegerency and eternal bliss or one that leads to degeneration, degradation or self-disintegration. Almost everything becomes possible for him provides he has will and takes an initiative.

Man cannot, says Iqbal, be contained in one destiny. There is scope for many destinies (taqdirat). If one destiny cannot suit man, he can demand for the other destiny. Iqbal makes it clear that destiny changes if we change ourselves. It implies that the kind of act or path we follow will lead to that kind of destiny. The latter changes in accordance with the change in man’s deeds:

If a certain taqdir has tormented you,
Then pray for some other taqdir.
If you wish for new taqdir, it is permissible, Because there is no limit of taqdirat with God. Its subtle indication lies in the single phrase, If you change yourself your destiny stands changed.

Iqbal tries to reconcile freedom of man and determinism or destiny of God. To him, there is no contradiction between the two. He describes human destiny as a limitation to Divine Activity yet this limitation is self imposed by God and cannot be compared to human limitations. It does not rob the former of His infinity and Omnipotence. It is limitation that makes Divine Ego (God) intelligible to the finite egos which are given private initiative to act and are not, thus, outside God. He is their source and they are organically related to Him. God is the ultimate determining power to guide and direct them in their acts.

Freedom and creative power, according to Iqbal, are bestowed by God an man otherwise he will be reduced to a nonentity. He won’t be able to conceive and express himself. His freedom is however, limited by God whose freedom is absolute. Man is not free like God. But his freedom raises him to heights and unique status. It opens for him the vast field of activity. Man cannot create like God yet has the capacity to change the Divine creation with Divine help, guidance and grace. In spite of his limitations he can bring change in himself and in his environment. This is his sphere of creation and freedom:

Thou (God) created night, I (man) created the lamp.
Thou created day, I created the cup.
Thou created deserts, mountains and forests,
I created orchards, gardens and groves.
I am the one who makes the glass out of stone.
I am the one who turns poison into an ontidote.53

In Iqbalian thought although man freedom yet he is not absolutely free like God. He owes his existence, body, soul and life to God. He is destined to express and actualise his possibilities granted by God. It is not physical or rigid determinism or fatalism. Man is free to select the possible alternatives and become responsible for his own deeds. His is the destiny of hope and enthusiasm rather than a ruthless compulsion.

From the above discussion it is clear that the problem of free will and determinism has remained baffling to mankind in general and the Muslim treatment of it illustrates the appropriation of man’s role in the world of Divine power and creation. Muslim theologians (mutakalimun) like Mu’tazilah and Ash’riah look at the problem and relates it to Allah’s Justice and the sense of reason in man himself. Ash’riah on the other hand, observe that power of action in man lies really with God and the former derives it from the latter (God) and so he is the acquisitor (muktasib) of actions rather than their creator. The power of action is bestowed man by God and His is the effective power and that of man is acquisitive as he takes initiative to do the act. The power corresponds with the choice and initiation of man and results in the completion of an act which is rewarded as per its merit. In the two outstanding medieval Muslim scholars, al-Ghazzali and Shah Wali Allah, several important points have been explained about the subject.

Al-Ghazzali maintains that human heart is control in moulding, initiating and deciding the activity and conduct of man. The heart is however, susceptible to both Divine and Satanic influences yet it is tantamount to fatalism or rigid determinism. Shah Wali Allah emphasis the harmonious between taqdir (God’s power) and taklif (responsibility) of man. The latter is realised when possibility and capability (isti’dad) has been created in him. It signifies the freedom of man within the wider universal scheme of God (al-tadbir wahdani), encompassing both the eternal and the temporal domains. In his profound treatment of the subject, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal elaborates it through his concept of ‘ego’ (human self) and taqdir (destiny). To him the ego is basically a Divine-oriented entity and by providing him the environment of cause and effect or time and space is to amplify his freedom. This makes him to initiate, act, create and shape his world which also becomes his destiny (taqdir)-fore knowledge of God transcending the world of time and space. However, man is not free like God whose freedom is Absolute and enjoys the special and unique status among His creatures by this freedom.

References and Notes:

1. Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, SBW Publishers, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 50-94. 2.M. Amin Ahsan Islahi, Falsafay kay Bunyadi Masa’il, Qur’an wa Sunnat Academy, New Delhi, 2001, 160-165. 3.See Marvin Perry and others (Editors), Western Civilization, Houghton Mittlin Company Boston, 1989. 4.See Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, Masala Jabr wa Qadr, Markazi Maktaba Islami, Delhi, 1979, pp. 26-27. 5.Shaykh M. Abu Zahrah, Islami Mazahib, Maktaba Thanvi, Deoband (UP), 1982, pp. 137-138. 6.The Holy Qur’an, al-An‘am, 148-149.

7.Quoted in Sayid Abul Ala Maududi, op. cit.,p. 40.
8.Ibid.
9.The Holy Qur’an, 18:54
10.Shaykh M. Abu Zahrah, op. cit, pp. 144-149.
11.Ibid.
12.The Holy Quran, al-Dahr, 76: 29-30.
13.Isma‘il R.al-Faruqi, Lois Lamya al-Faruqi The Cultural Atlas of Islam,
Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1986, p. 285. 14.Shaykh M. Abu Zahrah, op.cit, pp. 156-159.
15.Mu‘tazilah was one of the important theological schools which emerged during later Ummayyad period and flourished under the Abbasid rule. Its rise is attributed to many factors. Some say political rivalary among the rulers which resulted in bloodshed and the poeple who disassociated themselves from ‘politics’ to concentrate on Belief (aqa’id) and worship (ibadah) of Islam were Mutazalites. It is also held that due to the interaction with people of other faith and culture and explaining as well defending Islamic Beliefs and Teachings on rational grounds led the formation of Mutazilah school. The commonly accepted opinion is that it was founded by Wasil bin Ata (d. 131/749) who was initially the desciple of Hasan Basari, the distinguished scholar of his times. When the former, however, took the stand that the perpetrator of the grave sin (kabirah) is neither an unbeliever (as held by the Kharijiah) nor a believer (as held by the Murji’ah) but an intertermediate between these two positions (manzilah bain al-manzitalatain), Hasan Basari declared his scission (itizal) from the group and Wasil ibn ‘Ata began to explain his own doctrines that lead the formation of Mu’tazilah group. He was succeeded by Amr ibn ‘Ubay ‘Ala, Abu al Hudhail ‘Alaf Ibrahim al-Nazzam Amr al-Jahiz, Abu Hashim al-Jubbai etc. Mutazilah call themselves ahl al-tawhid wal’adl (people of Unity and Justice). Since the rational mood of Mutazilah was favourable to the public and they were encouraged by Abbasid caliphs like al Mansur, al-Mamun and al-Mu‘tasim but their later use of force rather than reason reduced them to unpopularity among the general public. See Shaykh Abu Zahrah, Islamic Mazahib; M.M. Sharif (ed.) History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. 1, Low Price Publication, Delhi, M.B. ‘Abu al-Karim Shahrastani, Kitab al Malal wa’l Nihal (Eng. trans. by A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn), London and W. Montgomary Wall, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh. 16.Asha’riah is another important theological school named after its founder ‘Ali ibn Isma’il al-Ash’ari (258-322)/873-935). He was first a member of the Mu’tazilah school and the student of one of its leaders, Abu ‘Ali al Jubba’i (d.303/915). He got dissatisfied with their rationalism and abandoned them and made a public repentance for his errors in the mosque of Basarah. As against the Mutazilah negation of God’s attributes and Createdness of the
Qur’an and absolute freedom of man al-Ash’ari developed his own system of ideas which became the doctrines of his school. Among them were his belief of Gods describing himself in terms of His attributes, the eternity of the Qur’an, acquisition of an act by man and reconciliation between revelation and reason, and this found popularity among the public. Later on Imam Baqilani and Ghazzali followed this line of the Ash’aria school. His famous work are al-Ibanah ‘an Usul ad-Diyanah, Maqalal-al-Islamiyyin and Risalah fi Istihsan al-Khawd fi-l-Kalam. 17.Shaykh Abu Zahra, op. cit, pp. 174-183.

18.M.M. Sharif (ed.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I, Low Price Publications, Delhi 1989, pp. 200-201. 19.Ibid, p. 229.
20.Ibid. p. 230.
21.’Abd al-Karim Shahrastani, Kital al Milal Wa’l Nihal, p. 53, quoted in Ibid p. 230. 22.cf. Shaykh Abu Zahra, op. cit. pp. 227-231.
23.Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali was a great scholar of medieval times. Born and died in Tus (1058-1111), he studied at Nayshabur with al-Juwayani, the imam of Haramain and got appointed as the professor of law at Nizamiyyah in Baghdad by the Viizer Nizam al Mulk, the statesman and the patron of learning. Al-Ghazzali had a variety of intrests, theology, law, philosophy, ethics, polity etc. but he turned ultimaterly to mysticism. His prominant works are Ihya al-Ulum al Din, al-Manqadh man al-Dalal, Tahafut al-Falasafah, Maqasad al-Falsafah, Nisihat al Muluk, Kimiyai Sa’adat and Mishkat al-Anwar. 24.Vide M. Umrauddin, Some Fundamental Aspects of Imam Ghazzali’s Thought, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1975, pp. 44-45. 25.The Holy Quran, 2:7.

26.M. Umaruddin, op. cit. p. 45.
27.Imam Ghazzali, Ihya Ulum ul-Din, Book III, Islamic Book Service, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 44-50. 28.Ibid., p. 25.
29.Ibid., p. 47.
30.Ibid., p. 26-27
31.Qutubuddin Ahmad Wali Allah commonly known as Shah Wali Allah Dehlvi was the distinguished scholar of Islam during the later medieval times. Born in 1703 at Phulat in Delhi. He studied at his father’s seminary Madrasa Rahimiya and completed the studies when he was 15 years. He started teaching
in the madrasa and also spent two years in Haramain where he learnt deeply Hadith science at the feet Shaykh wafadullah, Shaykh Taj al-Din Hanafi, Shaykh Abu Ibrahim Khuri, Shaykh Abu Tahir Madani the prominent scholars of the times. After his return back to India in 1732, he devoted most of his time to writings. This was a turning point in his career. He contributed remarkably to the various domains of sciences (ulum) like Kalam, Fiqh, Tafsir, Hadith, Tasawwuf and Polity. His Hujjat Allah al-Baligah is his magnum opus and the other widely known works are al-Budur al Bazigah, Tafhimat-i-Illahiya, al-Fauz-al Kabir fi al-Usuli Tafsir, al-Insaf fi Bayan al Sabab al Ikhtilaf and al-Kharal Kathir. 32.Shah Wali Allah, Hujjat Allah al-Baligah, Maktaba Thanvi, Madhari Amur, Pakistan, Deoband (U.P), 1986, p. 67. 33.Ibid., pp. 59-59.

34.Shah Wali Allah, Al-Badur al-Bazigah (Urdu trns by Dr. Qazi Mujib ur Rehman, Wazarat Madhabi Amur, Pakistan, Islamabad, pp. 01-02. 35.Ibid., pp. 67-68.
36.Shah Wali Allah, Hujjat Allah al -Baligah, Deoband, pp. 64. 37.The Holy Quran, 33:72.
38.Supra n. 36. p. 66.
39.Shibli Nu’mani is regarded as one of the leading Islamic scholars of modern times. He made a remarkable contribution to almost all fields of Islamic ulum. His Sirat al-Nabi (SAAWS), al-Faruq al-Ghazzali, al-Kalam, Ilm al-Kalam, Maqalat and Sha‘r al-Ajam are his important works. It is in his Maqalat Vol. 1, that Shibli deals with the problem of free will and determinism. See its fifth essay, “Qada wa qadr and Quran-i- Majid”. 40.Muhammad Marmadduke Pichthal, a great scholar and translator of the Holy Quran, discusses the issue in his Cultural Side of Islam. The book comprises the lectures delivered at Madras in 1927 under the auspices of the Committee of Madras Lectures, on Islam and the sixth lecture in the book treats the subject. 41.Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi the prominent Islamic scholar of the contemporary times, has occasinaly touched upon the theme of free will and determinism in his magnum opus, Tafhim al Qur’an but his booklet, Masla Jabr wa Qadr, is exclusively devoted to it. 42.Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, the distinguished scholar and mufasir of the Quran, has discussed the issue briefly in Falsafa kay Bunyadi Masail. 43.Fazlur Rehman is a great Islamic
intellectual of modern times. He has treated the issue (in Major Themses in Qur’an) precisely yet it marks his profundity. See also his Islamic Methodology in History, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, 1989. 44.See Muhammad Iqbal, Secrects of the Self (trans. by R. A. Nicholson), Arnold, Heinemann, 1978, pp. 71-81. 45.Sir Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Kitab Publishing House, Delhi, 1974, p. 108. 46.Ibid., p.50

47.Ibid.
48.Ibid., p. 49.
49.Ibid., p. 72.
50.Ibid., pp. 11-12.
51.Ibid., p. 12.
52.Iqbal Lahori, Kulyat Ash’ar Farsi (Javid Namah), Kitab Khana Sanai, p. 330. 53.Allam Iqbal, Payam-i-Mashriq, ‘Itiqad Publishing House, Delhi, 1993, pp. 329-330.